It might seem incongruous for a government that has vowed to give markets a “decisive” role in the economy to issue a new five-year plan. But the Chinese Communist party’s 13th strategy blueprint offers a window on how Beijing views the challenges of governance and economics — and insights into China’s directions, disagreements and dangers.

The plan’s intended audiences are a diverse group. The party will use the document to demonstrate leadership and mobilise the nation. For the government, the plan will be a tool of guidance and control. State-owned enterprises will study its implications for their financial support, overcapacity and any opportunities for sectors defined as “emerging strategic” and priority industries. The private sector will focus on favoured activities. Foreign investors can treat it as a preview of market potential and price expectations across asset classes. For public intellectuals, the planning process has allowed them the opportunity to express their views. The public, meanwhile, will look to the plan for big decisions on topics such as health, education and family planning.

To help explain the 13th five-year plan, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington is publishing an impressive report. I would stress six points.

First, President Xi Jinping’s primary goal is to preserve the party. The general secretary has assumed ownership of the plan and the party expects success to add to its legitimacy. Yet internal conflicts over the roles of markets and politics could spill over into a mixture of market and bureaucratic competition, making officials more cautious.

Second, the outlook is clear in two areas. Macroeconomic and tax reform policies directed from Beijing will rely more on markets. The plan commits China to continue moving towards a free-floating renminbi and to further reduce capital controls by 2020. In addition, China will pursue aggressive quantifiable environmental and social welfare objectives. These will require robust co-ordination at various levels of government.

Useful legal, financial and institutional steps are identified in the document, not all of them protectionist

Third, there appears to be uncertainty about the best ways to deal with industrial overcapacity, state-owned enterprises, the hukou household registration system limiting benefits for migrant workers, and rural land reforms. Administrative efforts to limit overcapacity have had little success but China seems unwilling to rely principally on markets and bankruptcies. The plan also signals that state companies will become bigger, stronger tools of national strategy. Look for more experimentation, incrementalism and uncertainty here.

Fourth, the plan offers a vision for Mr Xi’s “One Belt, One Road” project, reaching across Eurasia and surrounding seas, as well as the development of the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei economic zone. “One Belt, One Road” is more concept than reality but making it a priority will boost local initiatives, prompt central planners to propose guidelines, and encourage central-local co-operation.

Fifth, Mr Xi is focused on a shift from a middle income to a “moderately prosperous society” through innovation, and his plan lists priorities and new tools. This is an area that will generate internal tensions and debates with foreign partners. Useful legal, financial and institutional steps are identified in the document, not all of them protectionist. But the party will look to Chinese ownership, whether state or private. Chinese companies will probably push for favoured positions and less transparency. But those steps could cut the country off from global innovation and markets. When Japan opted for a “domestic” strategy for its telecoms sector, the results were poor.

Finally, the plan breaks ground by encompassing areas beyond the traditional economic focus, such as party-building, civil-military relations, global governance, international public goods and even international security. Mr Xi sees a revived party, stronger and free from corruption, as the vanguard of his economic transformation. Looking overseas, China will work with accepted international institutions while pursuing national interests as others do.

The 13th five-year plan reflects Mr Xi’s consolidation of power and party revitalisation. The strategy appears to be to strengthen China Inc rather than to transform it. Meanwhile, centralised power will probably conflict with decentralised markets and local innovation right up until the 19th party congress in late 2017, when the president and a new standing committee of the politburo will need to reassess the drive to create a new growth model. The Soviet Union managed only 13 plans, so the party’s real aim is to make sure China reaches number 14.

The writer is a former president of the World Bank and US trade representative