In offering proposals this week that went a long way toward meeting the creditors’ demands, Mr. Tsipras appeared to concede that exiting the euro would break the only red line that ever mattered, his pledge to keep Greece in the currency union. He has no mandate to turn his country into another Mediterranean failed state.

Of course, it’s still possible that no deal is reached, plunging Greece into a disorderly default. What is certain is that any deal now struck will be a bad one compared with what was on the table five months ago, a consequence of the damage wreaked on the economy.

The fastest growing economy in the eurozone in the second half of last year is now back in recession; a budget surplus before interests costs that was predicted to hit 2.6% of gross domestic product this year without any further fiscal measures is now heading for a deficit; bank bad debt charges that were expected to have peaked are still rising while €40 billion ($44.85 billion) of deposits have been withdrawn from the banking system.

The cost of this calamity has been borne by Greece’s beleaguered private sector and the thousands of young people who might have hoped to have found a job as the economy recovered but remain unemployed.

If Mr. Tsipras had his way, the private sector and younger workers would have been hit again under his proposals for a deal. Thanks to the deterioration in the economy, Athens now needs to find an extra €8 billion of budget measures to hit a target of a budget surplus before interest costs of 1% this year and 2.5% next year; that compares with budget measures of just €2.5 billion that the creditors were demanding only six months ago to hit a targeted primary budget surplus of 3% this year and 4.5% in 2016. Mr. Tsipras proposed to close this gap almost entirely through tax rises, including a jaw-dropping proposal for a retrospective 12% tax on 2014 corporate profits and a 3.5% tax on salaries to be paid by employers that would have undermined five years of effort to make labor costs more competitive.

The proposals were greeted with incredulity in the markets and in Greece, not least by opposition parties who want Greece to stay in the euro but dread having to support a program that would clearly sap growth and drive off investment. To the relief of many, the International Monetary Fund rejected the ideas out of hand Wednesday.

The Bank of Greece estimates that Mr. Tsipras’s proposals would have reduced growth by a full two percentage points whereas the proposals being put forward by the creditors, which put a much greater emphasis on spending cuts, including via reforms to the pension system, would reduce growth by only one percentage point, according to people familiar with the analysis.

But even a bad deal is better than no deal, say many Greek business leaders and officials. That’s partly because they believe that the negative impact of higher taxes will be far outweighed by the boost to confidence that would come with a deal. They say the economy can quickly regain some of the lost ground once the uncertainty over Greece’s future in the euro lifts and liquidity returns. More importantly, they also argue that if Mr. Tsipras does strike a deal with Greece’s creditors, it will change the political landscape.

For the first time since the original 2010 bailout, all the major political parties would have acknowledged the need for Greece to accept the bailout conditions. Only the extreme left- and right-wing parties would be left arguing for a return to the drachma.

This is important because once Mr. Tsipras has dipped his hands in the blood, Greek politics need no longer be dominated by the sterile debate over whether or not to accept the bailout conditions. Instead, Greek parties can finally embark on a mature debate about the best strategy to grow the Greek economy and enable it to regain access to financial markets.

Is it through piling taxes on the private sector while shielding the public sector, as Mr. Tsipras clearly believes? Or is it through liberalizing the economy, cutting taxes where possible and reforming the public sector?

Greek voters will finally have a chance to assess Mr. Tsipras and his party by their political choices rather than their promises and slogans; they will see whether Syriza is really prepared to confront vested interests and deliver worthwhile reforms.

That does not mean Greece’s troubles will be over. Even if a deal is agreed, no one expects a smooth ride as Mr. Tsipras tries to win parliamentary backing and then begins negotiations on the inevitable third bailout that will be needed later this year. But the true nature of the choices facing Greece will finally be clear: that itself would be progress.