There are many reasons to be concerned about the economic outlook for Europe. Risks are arising from political instability in Spain and Portugal, a looming standoff between Greece and its creditors, a possible British decision to quit the European Union and fallout from the potential unraveling of Europe’s Schengen passport-free travel zone.

But one risk that has preoccupied many investors in recent weeks can largely be discounted: the fear that the recent slide in world markets, including the price of oil, is foretelling a global growth slowdown that could derail the eurozone’s fragile recovery. The truth is that there is little evidence to support those concerns. The recent market gyrations could even work to Europe’s economic advantage.

Many European stock markets had fallen by more than 10% in little more than three weeks and 20% since last summer, pushing them into official bear market territory, before some soothing words from European Central Bank President Mario Draghi on Thursday sparked a rally.

But all signs point to this market slide—which began mysteriously on the last trading day of 2015 without any obvious news to trigger the rout—as having been a liquidity-driven event most likely sparked by a New Year change in investment strategy by a major, or several major, investors, perhaps a sovereign-wealth fund looking to liquidate assets to make up for budgetary shortfalls arising from low oil prices.

If the rout really had been prompted by global growth concerns or worries over systemic market stress, then one might have expected the slide to start in the sovereign bond markets rather than the equity markets, and for much bigger moves in government bond yields as investors rushed to traditional havens and dumped riskier assets.

Similarly, one might have expected the sharp falls in European bank stocks to have been accompanied by equally sharp rises in the cost of insuring European bank credit, which has been largely absent. Instead, the relatively uniform falls in European stock markets point to broadly based divestment, aggravated by the lack of secondary market liquidity, itself a reflection of the effect of post-crisis regulations on bank business models.

A hard landing for the Chinese economy would have an impact on the eurozone. But so far there is no sign of this. The International Monetary Fund has downgraded its forecast for Chinese growth this year to 6.3%, compared with 6.9% in 2015. But even if growth falls well short of this, the first-round impact on what is a largely domestic-demand-driven eurozone recovery is likely to be limited. Direct trade links between China and many of Europe’s most vulnerable economies are weak.

Despite an emerging market economic slowdown, eurozone economic indicators continued to strengthen, buoyed by cheap oil, ultraloose monetary policy, expansionary fiscal policy and a devalued exchange rate. An ECB survey of independent economists published last week showed forecasts for eurozone growth this year unchanged at 1.7%, reflecting the widely held assumption that weaker exports will be offset by stronger domestic demand.

Meanwhile European governments are actively considering how they can best take advantage of the collapse in oil prices to address domestic challenges. For more than a decade, high oil prices have acted as a giant tax on European economies paid to emerging markets; now European governments have an opportunity to collect a bit of that tax themselves. Providing additional oil taxes are offset by a growth-friendly rebalancing of tax systems, they could encourage investment and job creation while accelerating debt reduction.

That doesn’t mean eurozone policy makers are complacent. They worry declining equity prices and slower emerging market growth could knock corporate confidence and deter the investment urgently needed if the current cyclical recovery is to broaden into a sustainable long-term secular shift.

Prolonged weakness in credit markets might also lead to an unwelcome tightening of credit conditions, pushing up real interest rates. Similarly, this year’s steep falls in the oil price will bear down further on already weak nominal inflation and further drag down inflation expectations, which would also have the effect of pushing up real interest rates while making it harder for stressed countries to bring down their debt burdens. But the ECB has already signaled that it is prepared to act robustly to address these risks.

Indeed, the current market volatility may provide the pretext it needs for a further substantial extension of its bond buying program that the markets had anticipated in December. On that occasion, the ECB was forced to hold back because the case for further monetary easing was weak: Core inflation was strong, the monetary supply was expanding rapidly and credit conditions were easing.

The further into the future the ECB can extend its quantitative easing program beyond its current March 2017 scheduled end, the more it can minimize the one eurozone risk that still has the power to spook the markets: the fear that without ECB support, some eurozone government debts would once again look unsustainable.