AT 11am in London today, July 6th, Sir John Chilcot (pictured, in 2009) will present the findings of an inquiry into Britain’s role in Iraq between 2001 and 2009. The inquiry was due to report in 2014 but was delayed by wrangles over the release of documents relating to the war and a process whereby those criticised received a right to reply. The inquiry has been plagued by accusations. Some have questioned the rigour of its cross-examinations. For others, Sir John, his committee members and their staff are too close to the establishment to be impartial. Why is the report still important?

The decision of Tony Blair, the former prime minister, to take Britain into the Iraq war in 2003 was controversial from the start. It drove a wedge between him and his allies in France and Germany. About a million people marched in London against the decision. Mr Blair’s rationale was twofold: to remove Saddam Hussein (“regime change”) in the interests of the Iraqi people and broader regional stability, and to eradicate the threat Hussein’s regime posed to Britain. In selling the intervention to the British public, the government focused on the latter and in particular on a claim that Hussein had weapons of mass destruction with which he could target British cities within 45 minutes. Doubts about these arguments, combined with the long, violent wake of the invasion, have made the decision to go into Iraq politically toxic. Particularly unpopular in Britain is Mr Blair’s relationship with George W. Bush. Did Mr Blair and his advisers, too doe-eyed about Britain’s superpower ally, brush aside valid objections? The subject, or aspects of it, had been officially reviewed several times when, in 2009, Gordon Brown, Mr Blair’s successor, ordered the Chilcot inquiry: reflecting, as the last British troops left Iraq, that questions remained about the decision-making behind the intervention (cynics reckoned it was also a bid to draw a line under the Blair years).

In the seven years since then Sir John and his committee have reviewed 150,000 documents. Their final report contains 2.6m words. David Cameron and relatives of the 179 servicemen killed in the conflict received advance sight of it on July 5th. Newspaper reports claim that among those criticised are the spooks who marshalled the evidence underpinning Mr Blair’s decision in 2003 and those responsible for post-invasion planning.

In political terms the biggest question is this: how much fault does the report ascribe to Mr Blair? Recently the former prime minister has softened his otherwise firm defence of his decision; last October he acknowledged mistakes and apologised for faults in the intelligence. Still, for some no criticism of the former prime minister will be harsh enough. At a time of major distrust in elites and establishments there will surely be cries of “whitewash!”, whatever the report says.